This paper theoretically examines the relationship between FDI and environmental standard regulation. In particular, implications on "Pollution Haven", "Race to the Bottom" and "Regulatory Chill" hypotheses are given. Using a two country reciprocal trade model, we show that instead of "Race to the Bottom", a "Race to the Top" regulatory policy arises in equilibrium for transboundary pollution if markets are small. When markets are relatively large, "Regulatory Chill" occurs. Equilibrium FDI structure with the presence of emission standard regulation is also provided.
Introduction
The world is witnessing increasing economic and political concerns on environmental problems, for example, various coordinations and collaborations in environment protection and environmental policies have been put into the agenda of many bilateral and multilateral cooperations. This is because environment not only a¤ects the quality of human life, but also, as a kind of endowment and important input factor, is closely related with many economic activities and even economic growth. 1 See Grossman and Krueger (1991), Anderson and Blackhurst (1992) , Cole (1999) , Copeland and Taylor (1995) , Copeland and Taylor (1995) , Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) , Beghin et al (1995) 2 De Santis and Stähler (2008) study FDI and emission tax and …nd that such tax may not be necessarily low in host country since the host country has an incentive to shift the rent away from the source country, through tax revenues. 3 Neumayer (2000) de…nes that a country provides a pollution haven if it sets its environmental standard below the socially e¢ cient level in order to attract foreign investment from higher standards countries.
rison (2003) ) …nd no signi…cant correlation between location of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and environmental standards in host countries. Smarzynska and Wei (2001) identi…es some di¢ culties obstructing researchers in …nding empirical evidence to support "pollution haven" hypothesis. However, they also do not …nd sound support for this hypothesis using a …rm level data set on investment project in 24 transition economies. Gray (2002) points out that such a negative relationship may be industry speci…c, for example, in the furniture industry. Xing and Kolstad (2002) adopt a new measure for strictness of environmental regulation and …nd that for pollution-intensive industry, lax environment policies do attract foreign investment. Aliyu (2005) concludes that environmental policy is important in explaining the out ‡ow of FDI from OECD countries to less developed countries.
In this paper, we prove that FDI will raise the environmental standard of the host country. Several theoretical papers obtain similar results under di¤erent analytical frameworks. Wu (2004) …nds that the strategic rent extraction behavior between governments due to asymmetric information between MNEs and government weakens the pollution haven hypothesis. This actually provides a theoretic explanation for the failure of empirical studies in …nding evidence supporting pollution haven hypothesis. Using a political economy model with FDI liberalization, Cole et al. (2006) …nd that the environmental tax rate will increase with the number of foreign …rms in a country with low degree of corruptibility. Kayalica and Lahiri (2005) discuss the strategic emission standard when FDI is present in a third country market model. They …nd that when the host country of FDI does not allow free entry of FDI, the emission standard of the host country is stricter. However, FDI deregulation may increase source country's emission standard under some circumstances. Using a market share game on optimal emission tax, De Santis and Stähler (2008) conclude that the liberalization of FDI will drive the host countries of FDI to impose a higher environmental tax rate which is actually Pigouvian tax rate.
The current paper studies FDI and emission standards in a NorthSouth model. The game played is market share game, that is, …rms move before governments make policy decisions. Note that the environmental policy instrucment in this model is emission standard which is di¤erent from Cole et al. (2006) and De Santis and Stähler (2008) whose policy instrucment is environmental tax.
Emission standard, also called "performance standard", is a kind of command and control (CAC) instrument. It does not bring government any …scal revenue. Environmental tax, which could generate revenue for the government, is a representative kind of market-based incentive (MBI) instrument. Stavins (2000) points out that incentives (like tax) are more "cost-e¤ective"than CAC restrictions (like emission standard), as they could realize the environmental target with the lowest social cost by e¢ ciently allocating the burden of pollution reduction under asymmetry information. Because of "tax-exemption e¤ect of environmental standard" regulation (Ulph (1998)), emission tends to be higher under standard compared to tax. Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) demonstrate that under open economy scenario countries are worse o¤ by shifting from environment tax to environment standard, as this will increase the production and total emission. Fullerton (2002) has clari…ed that emission standard and environmental tax can achieve the same e¢ ciency e¤ect, i.e. they can improve the economic e¢ ciency by the same level under symmetric information. Yet emission standard could be more e¢ cient in monitoring and enforcing when information is asymmetric.
The novelty of the model is that it combines countries' technology asymmetry, endogenous tari¤s (i.e.endogenous trade cost), transboundary pollution, and optimal emission standards together. The main results of this paper are that (i) the tari¤ of North is prohibitive in equilibrium when market sizes of both countries are not large enough, that is, the Southern …rm will not be able to sell its product in the Northern market unless it builds a new plant in the North through FDI; (ii) if market sizes of the two countries are small, FDI will raise the emission standard of the host country, which is contrary to the "race to the bottom" e¤ect; if market sizes are larger enough, FDI will not change the emission standard of the South which is in the laxest form, this theoretically supports "regulatory chill"; (iii) Equilibrium FDI is contingent on the …xed cost of FDI, as traditional proximity-concentration tradeo¤ predicts.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model, Section 3 discusses the equilibria of emssion standards under di¤erent FDI-export scenarios of …rms, Section 4 studies the FDI equilibrium, Section 5 concludes the model.
The Model
There are only two countries in the model, a North and a South. Each country has one …rm. Countries di¤er in production technologies: the North is endowed a cleaner technology, that is, when producing the same amount of product, the …rm in the North generates less emissions than does the one in the South. Pollution is completely transboundary, as in the case of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission.
Firms in both countries serve their domestic markets, and at the same time, they could serve the foreign markets through export or FDI (but not both export and FDI). If a …rm sells its product to the foreign market through export, it faces an endogenous tari¤ set by the welfare-maximizing foreign government. This tari¤ is just the cost of international trade. If the …rm serves the foreign market through FDI, it faces a …xed lump sum cost of building up a new plant. Firms'FDI decision is based on proximity-concentration tradeo¤.
The game played in this model is market share game in which …rms make decisions before governments, instead of race-to-the-bottom game in which governments make decisions on environmental policies …rst. The order of the play is as follows: Both countries have simple linear demand Q i = a P i , i 2 fn; sg, where n and s stand for the North and South respectively. Q i and P i are the total consumption and product price of country i respectively. Q i = q i i + q i j , i; j 2 fn; sg, i 6 = j. q i i stands for the quantity of …rm i sells in its home market, while q i j is the quantity of …rm j (6 = i) sells in its home market, i.e. market i.
In this model, z i , i 2 fn; sg, stands for the emission standard of country i. Following Kayalica and Lahiri (2005) , assume that the marginal cost function of …rm i is c i (e ij ) = c i0 + i ( i e ij ), i; j 2 fn; sg. It is a function of e ij , which is the emission level chosen by …rm i when it produces the goods in country j and is constrained by the emission standard of country j, z j . Let i be the total amount of pollutant generated by …rm i when producing one unit of product (called "pollutant of unit product" in the rest of this paper), then 0 e ij min f i ; z j g, and i e ij is the amount of abatement. North has a cleaner technology, or n < s . i is the marginal cost of abatement, and c i0 is the part of marginal cost of production independent of emission abatement. To simplify the discussion in the rest of this paper, and without loss of generality, assume that c i0 = 0, i = 1, i.e, c i (e ij ) = i e ij , where i < a.
The pollution considered in this model is transboundary, that is, a public bad. The damage function of emission is D (E) = !E, where E is the total amount of the world emission, and ! describes the seriousness of the environmental problem. Assume in this model that ! = 1.
When …rms export their products to the foreign markets, they face tari¤s set by the foreign governments: Denote T i as the tari¤ of country i to the foreign …rm. The …xed cost of building a plant is F .
Emission Standard Game
This section discusses the equilibria of emission standard under di¤erent FDI-export scenarios. Note that a government will not set an emission standard that is higher than the pollutant of unit product ( ) of every …rm producing goods in this country 4 . Secondly, for …rm i producing goods in country j, there is e ij = min f i ; z j g. This is due to the nature of this model. In the model of this paper, more emissions incur no cost to the …rms, so a pro…t-maxizing …rm will not stop increasing it emission level until it reaches min f i ; z j g.
No FDI
Consider …rst the case that both …rms from the North and South are not allowed to conduct FDI, so they can only enter foreign markets through export. The objective functions of the …rms in South and North are respectively
The superscript EE stands for the case that both countries serve foreign market through export. The …rst parts of both pro…t functions are the pro…ts of …rms obtained in their home market, and the second parts are export pro…t. Exports q n s , q s n should be of nonnegative quantities. For the southern …rm, its output levels in domestic and foreign mar-ket are respectively
For the northern …rm, its production levels in domestic and foreign market are respectively
When …rms do not conduct FDI, they set their emission levels according to the emission standard of their home countries. In this case the total amount of world emission is
The social welfare of the South and North countries under the no-FDI case can be expressed as
The components of social welfare under this scenario include consumer surplus
, pro…ts, tari¤ revenue (T s q s n ; T n q n s ), and environmental damage. According to (3), (4), (5), (6), optimal tari¤s of the South and North countries can be solved out through FOCs of social welfare maximization, they are
T n = a c s (e ss ) e nn + 2e ss 3 :
Since …rms only produce goods in their home country and set emission levels according to domestic emission standards, there must be e ss = z s s , e nn = z n n . Substitute (3), (4), (5), (6), (9), (10) into the social welfare functions, i.e. (7), (8) , it is easy to …nd that W EE s and W EE n are concave in z s and z n respectively. According to the best response functions drived from (7), (8) under constraits z s s , z n n , the equilibrium of emission standard should be
This emission standard equilibrium leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When the market sizes of countries are small, that is, s < a 4 s 2 n , the tari¤ of the North is prohibitive and prevent southern …rm exporting to the North in equilibrium, i.e. q n s = 0; when the market sizes of countries are larger enough, that is a > 4 s 2 n , the southern …rm exports to the North.
Proof. Substitute (11) and (9), into (4), the optimal quantity of southern …rm's export to the North can be reduced to q n s = a 4 s + 3 n z n 9 :
. Since s > n , q n s < 0: q n s should be a non-negative quantity, so in equilibrium, q n s = 0;
< 0:q n s should be a non-negative quantity, so in equilibrium, q n s = 0;
Intuitively, when market demand is small, the bene…t of environment outweights the loss from consumer surplus. But when markets are large, such relation reverses. According to Proposition 1, because of corner solutions, the outputs should be modi…ed when s < a 4 s 2 n , that is, q n s = 0 and q
(northern …rm is monopolist in its domestic market). The equilibrium of emission standard is described below,
Unilateral FDI from North to South
This subsection considers the case where the northern …rm serves the Southern market through FDI, while southern …rm serves the northern market through export (we use superscript F E to label this case). When the northern …rm establishes a new plant in the South instead of exporting, it will not su¤er from trade cost (the tari¤) any more, however, there is a …xed cost of FDI, F . The objective functions of South and North …rms under this case are respectively, Notice that the competition in the northern market is the same with that in the case of no FDI. In Appendix A, it is proven that the proposition 1 also holds in this case. Hence when s < a 4 s 2 n , q n s = 0, and the northern …rm becomes monopolist in its home market, and q n n = (a cn(enn)) 2 : Since the new subsidiary plant of the northern …rm is located in the South, the production of this plant must comply the emission standard set by the southern government. As a result, the cost of the northern …rm's product sold in the southern market becomes c n (e ns ). As discussed at the beginning of this section, there must be e ns = minf n ; z s g. As for e ss , e nn , the emission levels of …rms when they produce goods in their home markets, there is still e ss = z s s , e nn = z n n . n < s , so it is entirely possible that the southern government sets an emission standard z s 2 ( n ; s ). If so, e ns = n .
The total amount of world emission in this case is E F E = (q 
If z s 2 [ n ; s ], as discussed above, there will be e ns = n , e ss = z s , e nn = z n . In this case, W F E s and W
F E n
are both concave in z s , z n , then the optimal emission standards of countries are (z s ; z n ) = (minfa s + n ; s g; minfa n ; n g) :
In Section 2, it was assumed that a > s , therefore a s + n > n . Hence z s = minfa s + n ; s g 2 [ n ; s ]. If z s 2 [0; n ), then e ns = z s , e ss = z s , e nn = z n . In this case the social welfare of both countries are also concave in z s , z n . The equilibrium of emissions standards are, (z s ; z n ) = (0; minfa n ; n g) :
To determine whether the Southern government will set z s within [ n ; s ] or within [0; n ), one needs to compare the values of W F E s under these two cases, W F E s j (z s ;z n )=(minfa s+ n; sg;minfa n; ng) W F E s j (z s ;z n )=(0;minfa n; ng) (19)
Unilateral FDI from South to North
In subsection 3.1 and 3.2, it is proved that if the southern …rm chooses to serve the foreign market through export, it may …nally export nothing, as the foreign market is small and the South has competitive disadvantage, the pro…t earned from export may not cover the trade cost. Here we explore whether FDI can be a substitute. The objective functions of southern and northern …rms are respectively F , is the pro…t of southern …rm earned by FDI. Notice the cost of the southern …rm's product sold in the North, it now becomes c s (e sn ), because under FDI the southern …rm has to comply the emission standard set by the northern regulator.
From (20) and (21), the optimal output levels of the both …rms in each market can be solved out, they are
The total amount of world emission in this case is E EF = q 
Substituting the optimal quantities (22) and (25) into (26) yields the optimal tari¤ of South T s = a c n (e nn ) e ss + 2e nn 3 :
This expression of optimal tari¤ is structurally similar to (9), however, they may not equal in value, because the change of the southern …rm's way of serving foreign market make induce the change of emission standard equilibrium and the emission levels of …rms. In this case, the emission levels of …rms can be characterized as e ss = minf s ; z s g, e sn = minf s ; z n g, e nn = minf n ; z n g. Since n < s , it is possible that the North sets an emission standard z n 2 ( n ; s ) to strengthen the competitive advantage of the northern …rm.
If z n 2 [ n ; s ], then there will be e ss = z s , e sn = z n , e nn = n . Substitute (22) , (23), (24), (25) and (28) into (26), (27) , we can …nd that W EF s and W EF n are concave in z s , z n respectively. Accoring to the best response functions between z s , z n under constraints 0 z s s and n z n s , the equilirium of emission standards is
In this equilibrium, there is always z n = n 2 [ n ; s ].
If z n 2 [0; n ), then there will be e ss = z s , e sn = z n , e nn = z n . Under this circumstances, W EF s and W EF n are also concave in z s , z n respectively. Accoring to the best response functions between z s , z n under constraints 0 z s s and 0 z n < n , the equilirium of emission standards is
In this equilibrium, there is always z n = 0 2 [0; n ).
Whether the North will choose n or 0 emission standard depends on the values of North's social welfare under the two cases. To carry out comparison, given the interval of a, compute the di¤erence of the social welfare under these two cases
From the results of (31), (32), it is easy to …nd that the northern regulator always chooses the most stringent emission standard, i.e., z n = 0. 
Bilateral FDI
Notice that …rms'costs of products sold in foreign market has become c s (e sn ) and c n (e ns ), that is because after FDI, the new plant operates in the foreign country and is subject to the emission standard of the foreign government. Based on this fact, the emission levels of …rms in each market can be characterized as e ss = z s s , e sn = z n s , e nn = minf n ; z n g, e ns = min f n ; z s g.
For any country i, i 2 fn; sg, its emission standard could be within [0; n ) or [ n ; s ]. The emission standard of each country is discussed below separately. 
z s = 0 falls in the interval [0; n ), so it is acceptable.
The governments are welfare maximizers, so to determine which standard the South will choose, it is needed to compare the social welfare of the country under these standards. When a < 2 s n , z s = min fa s + n ; s g = a s + n , then
According to this result, the emission standard of South is
When a 2 s n , z s = min fa s + n ; s g = s , then
Based on this di¤erence of welfare, the emission standard of South is
For the North:
, then there will be e nn = n and e sn = z n . W F F n is concave in z n , so from @W F F n @zn = 0, we could solve out the optimal emission standard z n , it is
z n = n is within the interval [ n ; s ].
2. If z s 2 [0; n ], then there will be e nn = e sn = z n . W F F n is still concave in z n in this case, so from @W F F n @zn = 0, we could solve out the optimal emission standard z n , it is
Since
To determine which standard the North government will choose, it is needed to compare the social welfare of the country under these standards.
When
According to this result, the North always sets z n = ( s n) 2 if n < s < 3 n .
FDI' s Impact on Emission Standard
Given the states of both …rms and a speci…c set of parameters, it is easy to determine the emission standard equilibrium. However, ceteris paribus, it is still not clear how the liberalization of FDI, or say countries' shift from export to FDI, will a¤ect the emission standard equilibrium of the countries, which is a hot topic among economists, politicians and environmentalists. Existing empirical works generally have di¢ culties in …nding hard evidence to support that the liberalization of FDI will force countries'environmental policies to "race to the bottom" and some countries serve as "pollution havens". Some recent papers, including Wu (2008), have provided some explanations for this di¢ culties and/or results contrary to "race to the bottom" e¤ect and "pollution haven" hypothesis. This paper also shows that "race to the top" may arise in equilibrium. However, our results is not one sided, i.e., under some conditions "regulatory chill" also occurs.
In the rest of this subsection, let the combinations of F DI and Ex denote speci…c FDI-export scenarios. The left term in the parenthesis stands for the strategy of the northern …rm, and righ term stands for that of the southern …rm, for instance, (F DI; Ex) denotes the case that northern …rm conducts FDI and South exports. Table 1 depicts the equilibria of emission standards under di¤erent FDI-export scenarios, when the technological gap between North and South is small and market sizes are small. , which implies that the North sets a more stringent emission standard than the South. Under (F DI; Ex) and (Ex; F DI), the host countries of FDI, i.e., South and North respectively, both set their emission standards at 0, the most stringent form of environmental policy. Table 2 below reports similar results. 
In table 2, under (Ex; Ex), since z n = n < z s = s ; both countries adopt lassez faire policy. Under (F DI; Ex) and (Ex; F DI), the host countries of FDI, i.e. South and North respectively, both set their emission stand at 0, the most stringent form of environmental policy. These two tables lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The liberalization of FDI may strengthen the emission standard of the host country of FDI, making the environmental policy of the host country more stringent, which is contrary to the "race to the bottom" e¤ect.
Proof. In Table 1 , which is a positive value 2 s n < a < 2 n , to 0; changing from (Ex; Ex) to (Ex; F DI), the emission standard of the North decreases from a + n 2 s , which is above 0, to 0; changing from (Ex; Ex) to (F DI; F DI), the emission standards of the North and South countries respectively decrease from a + n 2 s and a + < a < 2 n and 0.
2. In Table 2 , changing from from (Ex; Ex) to (F DI; Ex), the emission standard of the South decreases from s to 0; changing from (Ex; Ex) to (Ex; F DI), the emission standard of the North decreases from n to 0; changing from (Ex; Ex) to (F DI; F DI), the emission standards of the North and South countries respectively decrease from n and s to ( s n) 2
and 0.
As clari…ed above, the results of this model is not one sided. Table  3 below o¤ers a di¤erent case. In this case, the emission standard of South takes the laxest form in all FDI-export scenarios.
Proposition 3
The liberalizaion of FDI may not make the emission standard of the host country more stringent, which supports the "regulatory chill" hypothesis.
Proof. In Table 3 , technology gap between between the North and South countries is moderate, i.e. 2 n < s < 3 n , and the market size of countries is larger enough, i.e. 4 s 2 n < a. When changing from (Ex; Ex) to (F DI; Ex), the host country of FDI, South, holds its emission standard at s ; when changing from (Ex; Ex) to (F DI; F DI), the South still holds its emission standard at s .
FDI Equilibrium
We solve the market share game using backward induction. In the preceeding section, equilibria of emission standards under di¤erent FDIexport scenarios are obtained as best reactions of governments to …rms FDI decisions. With these best responses, it is easy to compute the pro…ts of …rms under various FDI-export scenarios.
The game that …rms interactively make decisions FDI can be modelled as a static form game (see Figure 1) , denoted by FDI-Export game. In this game, a …rm strategically decides whether to carry out FDI, it does not only consider whether it can earn a higher pro…t under FDI than under export in the foreign market, but also take into account the impact of its decision on its pro…t in home market. In this case, if upon FDI, the increase of …rm's domestic pro…t is more than o¤set the loss of its foreign pro…ts, FDI strategy will be chosen.
In this section, according to 
Proposition 4
The Nash equilibrium of the FDI-Export game is contingent on the value of …xed cost of building a new plant abroad, 1. If F > F 1 , then the Nash equilibrium is that both …rm choose to sale abroad through export;
2. If F 1 > F > F 4 , the Nash equilibrium is unilateral FDI from North to the South;
3. If F 4 > F > 0, the Nash equilibrium is bilateral FDI.
Proof. The …rst step is to compare F 1 , F 2 , F 3 and F 4 with each other. Since a > s > n ,
(68a 41 s 27 n ) > 0;
(7a 4 s 3 n ) > 0;
(8a 3 s 5 n ) > 0; and
According to the comparison above"there is F 1 > F 2 > F 3 and F 4 . When F > F 1 , to export is the dominant strategy for both …rms, so the equilibrium is no FDI in this case; when F 1 > F > F 2 , to export is the dominant strategy for the southern …rm, and F E n EE n = F 1 F > 0, so the equilibrium in this case is unilateral FDI from North to the South; when F 2 > F , only the sign
= F 4 F matters, because to carry out FDI is dominant strategy for the northern …rm. When F 2 > F > F 4 , the equilirium is also unilateral FDI from North to South; when F 4 > F > 0, the equilibrium is bilateral FDI.
The result here is the typical extension of proximity-concentration framework of FDI.
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the interrelationship between FDI and environmental policy using a North-South model in market share game. The policy instrument considered in the model is a conventional CAC one, emission standard, which does not generate any …scal revenue for a government.
The trade cost in the current paper is endogenous tari¤, similar to the melting-iceberg trade cost. With this assumption, it can be proven that if the southern …rm exports, then it will export, because the fact that trade cost will overweigh its pro…t preventing it from exporting a positive quantity to the foreign market.
An important …nding of this paper is that whether FDI will make countries'environmental policies more stringent or lax may depend on the technology gap and market sizes of the countries. In this model, we …nd that if the South only has a small lag in technology and both markets are small, the host country of the FDI may loosen it emission standard upon FDI liberalization, causing "race to the bottom" e¤ect. If countries'technology gap is moderate and market sizes are su¢ ciently large, then the South is reluctant to tighten its emission standard, i.e., "regulatory chill" hypothesis may hold.
As an usual exercise, FDI versus export as strategies to serve foreign markets, are characterized. Conditions for which that both countries choose to export, unilateral FDI from North to South, and bilateral FDI in equilibrium are given.
The limitation of the model is that it does not consider employment concerns, spillover of technology and R&D, and the like, representing some important dimensions of the interrelationship between FDI and environment policies. Future research may include these factors, preferablly in a dynamic model.
Appendix A
According to the objective funcions of North and South …rms in subsection 3.2, the optimal production levels of every …rms in each market can be solved out 
In this FDI-export scenario, the total amount of world emission is E F E = (q w.r.t T n , we can …nd the optimal tari¤ T n = a c s (e ss ) e nn + 2e ss 3 :
Substitute (51) into (46), we can obtain q n s = a 4 s + 3 n e nn 9 Since there are also e ss = z s s , e nn = z n n , the equilibirum of emission standard of North is z n = a + 
:
Then following the proof of proposition in subsection 3.1, it is easy to prove that q n s = 0; if s < a 4 s 2 n ; q n s > 0; if a > 4 s 2 n .
